

Rigorously & “Brainishly” Speaking, What are We?

Bringsjord v. Granger

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Intro to Logic-based AI (ILBAI)
11/11/2024



Topics Before Granger Madness

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.
- DFT+ via o1 preview.

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.
- DFT+ via o1 preview.
- Try a new Live Logic problem?

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.
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- Try a new Live Logic problem?
- Back to the ladder & SOL in HyperSlate®.

Topics Before Granger Madness

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- Try a new Live Logic problem?
- Back to the ladder & SOL in HyperSlate®.
- DoubleMindedMan explored/solved.

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.
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- Try a new Live Logic problem?
- Back to the ladder & SOL in HyperSlate®.
- DoubleMindedMan explored/solved.
- Can we simulate o1 preview on **SOL** problems?

Topics Before Granger Madness

- Wrap-up of AI & Idolatry.
- DFT+ via o1 preview.
- Try a new Live Logic problem?
- Back to the ladder & SOL in HyperSlate®.
- DoubleMindedMan explored/solved.
- Can we simulate o1 preview on **SOL** problems?
- Now to Bringsjord vs. Granger ...

Exemplar in HG®

Exemplar in HG[®]

```
(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))
```

Exemplar in HG[®]

(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))

(forall (x) (= (func 1 (inc x)) (inc (inc (func 0 x))))))

Exemplar in HG[®]

`(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))`

`(forall (x) (= (func 1 (inc x)) (inc (inc (func 0 x))))))`

`(forall (n x) (= (func (inc n) (inc x) (func n (func (inc n) x))))))`

Exemplar in HG[®]

(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))

(forall (x) (= (func 1 (inc x)) (inc (inc (func 0 x))))))

(forall (n x) (= (func (inc n) (inc x) (func n (func (inc n) x)))))

(NatNum 1)

Exemplar in HG[®]

```
(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))
```

```
(forall (x) (= (func 1 (inc x)) (inc (inc (func 0 x))))))
```

```
(forall (n x) (= (func (inc n) (inc x) (func n (func (inc n) x))))))
```

```
(NatNum 1)
```

```
(forall (n) (if (NatNum n) (NatNum (inc n))))
```


Exemplar in HG[®]

`(forall (n) (= (func n 1) (inc 1)))`

`(forall (x) (= (func 1 (inc x)) (inc (inc (func 0 x)))))`

`(forall (n x) (= (func (inc n) (inc x) (func n (func (inc n) x)))))`

`(NatNum 1)`

`(forall (n) (if (NatNum n) (NatNum (inc n))))`

`(NatNum (func 5 5))?????`

Possible Paper

(Review k-order ladder)

Possible Paper

(Review k-order ladder)

Does $\mathcal{L}_3 = \text{TOL}$ work in HyperSlate? Partially?
Not at all? What's possible and what's not?
What exactly is needed inference-rule-wise for
a full natural-deduction system for TOL. Can a
chatbot like GPT-4 o1 preview etc. handle TOL
reasoning challenges expressed in English?
What specimens do you have for your answer?

Some Roots of the Debate



The grammar of mammalian brain capacity

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ABSTRACT

Uniquely human abilities may arise from special-purpose brain circuitry, or from concerted general capacity increases due to our outsized brains. We forward a novel hypothesis of the relation between computational capacity and brain size, linking mathematical formalisms of grammars with the allometric increases in cortical-subcortical ratios that arise in large brains. In sum, i) thalamocortical loops compute formal grammars; ii) successive cortical regions describe grammar rewrite rules of increasing size; iii) cortical-subcortical ratios determine the quantity of stacks in single-stack pushdown grammars; iv) quantitative increase of stacks yields grammars with qualitatively increased computational power. We arrive at the specific conjecture that human brain capacity is equivalent to that of indexed grammars – far short of full Turing-computable (recursively enumerable) systems. The work provides a candidate explanatory account of a range of existing human and animal data, addressing longstanding questions of how repeated similar brain algorithms can be successfully applied to apparently dissimilar computational tasks (e.g., perceptual versus cognitive, phonological versus syntactic); and how quantitative increases to brains can confer qualitative changes to their computational repertoire.

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1. Brain growth shows surprisingly few signs of evolutionary pressure

Different animals exhibit different mental and behavioral abilities, but it is not known which abilities arise from specializations in the brain, i.e., circuitry to specifically support or enable particular capacities. Evolutionary constraints on brain construction severely narrow the search for candidate specializations. Although mammalian brain sizes span four orders of magnitude [1], the range of structural variation differentiating those brains is extraordinarily limited.

An animal's brain size can be roughly calculated from its body size [2], but much more telling is the relationship between the sizes of brains and of their constituent parts: the size of almost every component brain circuit can be computed with remarkable accuracy just from the overall size of that brain [1,3–5], and thus the ratios among brain parts (e.g. cortical to subcortical size ratios) increase in a strictly predictable allometric fashion as overall brain size increases [6,7] (Fig. 1).

These allometric regularities obtain even at the level of individual brain structures (e.g., hippocampus, basal ganglia, cortical areas). There are a few specific exceptions to the well-documented allometric rule (such as the primate olfactory system [8]), clearly demonstrating that at least some brain structure sizes can be differentially regulated in evolution, yet despite this capability, it is extremely rare for telencephalic structures ever to diverge from the allometric rule [4,6,7,9]. Area 10, the frontal pole, is the most disproportionately expanded structure in the human brain, and has sometimes been argued to be selected for differential expansion, yet the evidence has strongly indicated that area 10 (and the rest of anterior cortex) are nonetheless precisely the size that is predicted allometrically [6,7,10,11].

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The modal argument for hypercomputing minds

Selmer Bringsjord*, Konstantine Arkoudas

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Received 14 July 2003; received in revised form 21 October 2003

Abstract

We now know both that hypercomputation (or super-recursive computation) is mathematically well-understood, and that it provides a theory that according to some accounts for some real-life computation (e.g., operating systems that, unlike Turing machines, never simply output an answer and halt) better than the standard theory of computation at and below the “Turing Limit.” But one of the things we do not know is whether the human mind hypercomputes, or merely computes—this despite informal arguments from Gödel, Lucas, Penrose and others for the view that, in light of incompleteness theorems, the human mind has powers exceeding those of TMs and their equivalents. All these arguments fail; their fatal flaws have been repeatedly exposed in the literature. However, we give herein a novel, formal *modal* argument showing that since it's mathematically *possible* that human minds are hypercomputers, such minds *are* in fact hypercomputers. We take considerable pains to anticipate and rebut objections to this argument. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Computationalism; Hypercomputation; Incompleteness theorems

1. Introduction

Four decades ago, Lucas [50] expressed supreme confidence that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem (=Gödel I) entails the falsity of computationalism, the view that human persons are computing machines (e.g., Turing machines). Put barbarically, Lucas' basic idea is that minds are more powerful than Turing machines. Today, given our understanding of hypercomputation in theoretical computer science, and given the absolute consensus reigning in cognitive science that the human mind is, at least in large part, *some* sort of information-processing device, we know enough to infer that if Lucas is right, the mind is a hypercomputer. However, Lucas' arguments have

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Some Roots of the Debate

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Abstract

Human brain capacity is a subject of intense scientific interest. A concerted effort to understand the relationship between brain size and computational capacity has been underway for decades. In this paper, we forward a novel hypothesis of the relation between computational capacity and brain size, linking mathematical formalisms of grammars with the allometric increases in cortical-subcortical ratios that arise in large brains. In sum, i) thalamocortical loops compute formal grammars; ii) successive cortical regions describe grammar rewrite rules of increasing size; iii) cortical-subcortical ratios determine the quantity of stacks in single-stack pushdown grammars; iv) quantitative increase of stacks yields grammars with qualitatively increased computational power. We arrive at the specific conjecture that human brain capacity is equivalent to that of indexed grammars – far short of full Turing-computable (recursively enumerable) systems. The work provides a candidate explanatory account of a range of existing human and animal data, addressing longstanding questions of how repeated similar brain algorithms can be successfully applied to apparently dissimilar computational tasks (e.g., perceptual versus cognitive, phonological versus syntactic); and how quantitative increases to brains can confer qualitative changes to their computational repertoire.

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
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doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.010


Fatal Objection?


I can simulate a logic machine that's at least a Turing machine ... e.g. by simulating some of what o1 preview provides me. Let's explore for SOL ...


“I don’t yet know how to handle ‘non-linearity’ in all of this, precisely. Maybe you can help. Here are some pointers, thoughts, initial constraints/structures ...”




























Art of Infallibility I

Logic

propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics

fragments of FOL

UIMA output




MiniMaxularity

...





Art of Infallibility I






Art of Infallibility I










Art of Infallibility I





Art of Infallibility I

temporal+epistemic+deontic

temporal+epistemic

temporal

epistemic

FOL

SOL

...

Logic


propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics


fragments of FOL


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



MiniMaxularity


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





















$\mathcal{DCEC}^*$

Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
(with Castañeda's *)

Infinitary (Aol 2)



$L_{\omega 1, \omega}$

FOL

Logic

SOL

epistemic

temporal

heterogeneous/visual

temporal+epistemic

temporal+epistemic+deontic

+planning+arg semantics

...

Art of Infallibility I



MiniMaxularity

...

propositional logic

semantic-web logics

description logics

fragments of FOL

UIMA output

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1. natural language semantics (non-Montagovian)
2. higher-cognition tests (for Psychometric AI)
(false-belief test, deliberative mind-reading
mirror test for self-consciousness ...)
3. ethically correct robots
4. biz & econ simulation

Infinitary (Aol 2)



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
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
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
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
fragments of FOL


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





















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mirror test for self-consciousness ...)
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Infinitary (Aol 2)



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Animal-Level AI

Super-Serious Human Cognitive Power

Serious Human Cognitive Power

Mere Calculative Cognitive Power

Entscheidungsproblem

Animal-Level AI

Analytical Hierarchy

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$P \subseteq NP \subseteq PSPACE = NPSPACE \subseteq EXPTIME \subseteq NEXPTIME \subseteq EXPSPACE$

Animal-Level AI

Analytical Hierarchy

Arithmetical Hierarchy

$\vdots$
 Π_2
 Σ_2
 Π_1
 Σ_1
 Σ_0

Entscheidungsproblem

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Arithmetical Hierarchy

Go:AlphaGo



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Jeopardy!: **Watson**

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

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Polynomial Hierarchy, Part I



(via formal logic, directly; a start)



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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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(Or a truth-graph y in $\mathbf{HS}^\circledast$ with at least one open branch.)


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
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
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
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
(Or every truth-graph y in $\mathbf{HS}^{\textcircled{R}}$ has no open branch.)

Polynomial Hierarchy, Part I

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


⋮




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


“What’s that $\Delta??$ ”




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

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
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

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
Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

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


Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

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


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
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
Eg:

$$\langle \phi_1, k \rangle \in L \text{ iff } \exists \phi_2 \forall \alpha KLogEquiv(\phi_1, \phi_2, |\phi_2| \leq k, \alpha(\phi_1) = \alpha(\phi_2))$$




Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

(via formal logic, directly)




Eg:

$$\langle \phi_1, k \rangle \in L \text{ iff } \exists \phi_2 \forall \alpha KLogEquiv(\phi_1, \phi_2, |\phi_2| \leq k, \alpha(\phi_1) = \alpha(\phi_2))$$




Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

(via formal logic, directly)



⋮





free variables

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Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

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free variables



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Now we generalize:

Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

(via formal logic, directly)



free variables

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

Now we generalize:

$$x \in \Sigma_i \text{ iff } \exists R \exists y_1 \forall y_2 \cdots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$$

($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)

Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

(via formal logic, directly)



free variables

Eg:

$$\langle \phi_1, k \rangle \in L \text{ iff } \exists \phi_2 \forall \alpha KLogEquiv(\phi_1, \phi_2, |\phi_2| \leq k, \alpha(\phi_1) = \alpha(\phi_2))$$

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

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Polynomial Hierarchy, Part II

(via formal logic, directly)




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free variables

Eg:

Now we generalize:

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
($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)

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
($Q_i = \exists$ if j even; $Q_i = \forall$ if j odd)

LM

$\mathcal{A}^n\mathcal{H}$ (Analytic Hierarchy)




CogSci and AI need to say more about where AI falls/can fall in the landscape.




Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTTMs)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

Human Brains
(according to Granger)




$\mathcal{CH}$ (Chomsky Hierarchy)


Turing Machines (TMs)
Linear Bounded Automata (LBAs)
Push Down Automata (PDAs)
Finite State Automata (FSAs)

LM

$\mathcal{A}^n \mathcal{H}$ (Analytic Hierarchy)




CogSci and AI need to say more about where AI falls/can fall in the landscape.



Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTMs)


Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

Human Brains
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$\mathcal{CH}$ (Chomsky Hierarchy)


Turing Machines (TMs)
Linear Bounded Automata (LBAs)
Push Down Automata (PDAs)
Finite State Automata (FSAs)



$$\mathbf{2SAMEFUNC} := \{\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle \mathbf{m}_1, u \rangle : v, k) \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle \mathbf{m}_2, u \rangle : v, k')]\}$$

Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Human Brains
(according to Granger)

$\mathcal{CH}$

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


$$\Delta_2^1$$

$$\Pi_1^1$$

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

2SAMEFUNC := $\{\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle \mathbf{m}_1, u \rangle : v, k) \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle \mathbf{m}_2, u \rangle : v, k')]\}$
 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Human Brains
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$\mathcal{CH}$

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable



Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

$$2\text{SAMEFUNC} := \{m_1, m_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle m_1, u \rangle : v, k) \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle m_2, u \rangle : v, k')]\}$$

(according to Bringsjord)

Let R be a Turing-decidable (= decidable, *simpliciter*) dyadic relation. Where is the set:


$$\{x : \exists y R(x, y)\},$$

1 2 3 or 4?

Human Brains
(according to Granger)

$\mathcal{CH}$

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)




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semi-decidable

$$\Pi_1^1$$


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Human Brains
 (according to Granger)

$\mathcal{CH}$

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
Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
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Human Brains
 (according to Granger)

$\mathcal{CH}$

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
Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
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$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
1 2 3 or 4?

$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R$ Human Brands $\exists y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
 (according to Granger)
 Π_i iff $\forall y_i \neg R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$ if i odd

$\mathcal{CH}$

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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 (according to Granger)
 (if i even; $Q_i = \forall$ if i odd)

$x \in \Pi_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \exists y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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$\mathcal{CH}$


$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$

Δ_2^1

semi-decidable

Π_1^1


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

$2\text{SAMEFUNC} := \{m_1, m_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle m_1, u \rangle : v, k \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle m_2, u \rangle : v, k'))]\}$
 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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 (according to Granger)
 ($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)


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Try your hand at classifying! ...

$\mathcal{CH}$

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

2SAMEFUNC := $\{\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle \mathbf{m}_1, u \rangle : v, k \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle \mathbf{m}_2, u \rangle : v, k'))]$
 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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Try your hand at classifying! ...

$\mathcal{CH}$


$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I

Δ_2^1

semi-decidable


Π_1^1



Can you see the carryover from PH?

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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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Try your hand at classifying! ...

From Kleene: The set to be classified, $\mathcal{K}$, consists of all those inputs to a given Turing machine $\mathbf{m}$ that results in this machine halting after some number of steps.

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

$2\text{SAMPFUNC} := \{\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle \mathbf{m}_1, u \rangle : v, k) \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle \mathbf{m}_2, u \rangle : v, k')]\}$
Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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
Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
 Human Brands
 ($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)
 (according to Granger)


$x \in \Pi_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \exists y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
 ($Q_i = \exists$ if j even; $Q_i = \forall$ if j odd)

Try your hand at classifying! ...

From Kleene: The set to be classified, $\mathcal{K}$, consists of all those inputs to a given Turing machine $\mathbf{m}$ that results in this machine halting after some number of steps.

$$\Delta^0_1 = \Sigma^0_1 \cap \Pi^0_1$$

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




Can you see the carryover from PH?

$$\mathbf{2SAMEFUNC} := \{ \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{m}_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle \mathbf{m}_1, u \rangle : v, k) \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle \mathbf{m}_2, u \rangle : v, k')]] \}$$

Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$$x \in \Sigma_i \text{ iff } \exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \cdots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$$

Human Brains
($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)

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
(according to Granger)
($Q_i = \exists$ if j even; $Q_i = \forall$ if j odd)

Try your hand at classifying! ...

From Kleene: The set to be classified, $\mathcal{K}$, consists of all those inputs to a given Turing machine $\mathbf{m}$ that results in this machine halting after some number of steps.

$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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
Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable

$x \in \Sigma_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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
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
Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable




Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



Can you see the carryover from PH?

2SAMEFUNC := $\{m_1, m_2 : \forall u \forall v [\exists k (\langle m_1, u \rangle : v, k \leftrightarrow \exists k' (\langle m_2, u \rangle : v, k'))]\}$
 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r\mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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 (according to Granger)
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Try your hand at classifying! ...

From Kleene: The set to be classified, $\mathcal{K}$, consists of all those inputs to a given Turing machine m that results in this machine halting after some number of steps.


$\mathcal{CH}$

Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable


Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I



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 Human Persons
 (according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Δ_2^1

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
$x \in \Pi_i$ iff $\exists R \forall y_1 \exists y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$
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$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
$$\Delta_2^1$$

$$\Pi_1^1$$

semi-decidable



Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
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$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



$$x \in \Sigma_i \text{ iff } \exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \cdots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$$

Human Brands
($Q_i = \forall$ if i even; $Q_i = \exists$ if i odd)
(according to Granger)

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
$$\Delta_2^1$$

$$\Pi_1^1$$

semi-decidable



Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
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Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
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Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



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
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From Kleene: The set to be classified, $\mathcal{K}$, consists of all those inputs to a given Turing machine $\mathbf{m}$ that results in this machine halting after some number of steps.

The set to be classified is the set of all pairs of programs P_1 and P_2 s.t. both compute exactly the same functions.

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




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Human Persons
(according to Bringsjord)

$\mathcal{A}^r \mathcal{H}$ (Arithmetic Hierarchy)



Δ_2^1

Π_1^1

semi-decidable

$$x \in \Sigma_i \text{ iff } \exists R \forall y_1 \forall y_2 \dots Q_i y_i R(x, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_i)$$

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Try your hand at classifying! ...


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$$\Delta_1^0 = \Sigma_1^0 \cap \Pi_1^0$$


(forall (u v) (exists (k1 k2)
(iff (comp m1 u v k1)
(comp m2 u v k2))))

Arithmetic Hierarchy, Part I




What about (oft vaunted) quantum computers?

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What about (oft vaunted) quantum computers?



Why can't a "neural" node be like tour nodes?

