The Failure of Deep Learning; GPT-4o/(5?) Bites the Dust

Selmer Bringsjord

Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
Department of Cognitive Science
Department of Computer Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy, New York 12180 USA

Intro to Logic-based AI
9/10/2026



While timelines are fresh in our minds, a peek ahead to an old “professional-level” challenge

…

Generative AI, Logico-Mathematically Unmasked By The Four-Decade-Old Worry!

Anonymous
All sparrows like any sparrows that like at most four sparrows that like themselves.

ChatGPT
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Logic-and-AI in the news

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Artificial Intelligence

Anthropic Researchers Raise Alarm Over A.I. Acceleration

Their warnings echo concerns that other artificial intelligence experts have voiced in recent months, as calls increase for a slowdown in the pace of development.



A protest outside Anthropic's offices in San Francisco. Lucas Foglia for The New York Times



By Kate Conger
Reporting from San Francisco

Sept. 9, 2026

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
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What OpenAI's latest controversy tells us about the future of math

AI companies are making impressive mathematical strides. Human mathematicians are losing out.

By Grace Huckins

September 9th, 2026



STEPHANIE ARNETT/MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW | GETTY IMAGES

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Today 11:14 AM

naveensundar.g@icloud.com Add

BREAKING: OpenAI might have stolen another major proof.


In a detailed Mastodon post, which I report in full in the comments, Andreas Thom presents several pieces of evidence suggesting that OpenAI may have trained Astra on conversations in which he and Gábor Kun were working on Gromov's soficity …

Valerio Capraro (@ValerioCapraro)
17K likes · 542 replies
x.com

"BREAKING: OpenAI might have stolen another major proof. "

A.I. Can Now Create Lifelike Videos. Can You Tell What's Real?


Test your understanding of artificial intelligence in this quiz.




Blade Runner … later.

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Testing GPT-4o …


Formula in propositional calculus.
$\mathfrak{a}_1$
F
0/1;
natural proof; certificate
percept
action

Most AI Punditry is Illogical, e.g. . . .


Without Consciousness, AIs Will Be Sociopaths

ChatGPT can carry on a conversation, but the most important goal for artificial intelligence is making it understand what it means to have a mind

ESSAY

By Michael S.A. Graziano + Follow

January 13, 2023 09:24 a.m. EST



ChatGPT, the latest technological sensation, is an artificial intelligence chatbot with an amazing ability to carry on a conversation. It relies on a massive network of artificial neurons that loosely mimics the human brain, and it has been trained by analyzing the information resources of the internet. ChatGPT has processed more text than any human is likely to have read in a lifetime, allowing it to respond to questions fluently and even to imitate specific individuals, answering queries the way it thinks they would. My teenage son recently used ChatGPT to argue about politics with an imitation Karl Marx.

As a neuroscientist specializing in the brain mechanisms of consciousness, I find talking to chatbots an unsettling experience. Are they conscious? Probably not. But given the rate of technological improvement, will they be in the next couple of years? And how would we even know?

Figuring out whether a machine has or understands humanlike consciousness is more than just a science-fiction hypothetical. Artificial intelligence is growing so powerful, so quickly, that it could soon pose a danger to human beings. We're building machines that are smarter than us and giving them control over our world. How can we build AI so that it's aligned with human needs, not in conflict with us?

As counterintuitive as it may sound, creating a benign AI may require making it more conscious, not less. One of the most common misunderstandings about AI is the notion that if it's intelligent then it must be conscious, and if it is conscious then it will be autonomous, capable of taking over the world. But as we learn more about consciousness, those ideas do not appear to be correct. An autonomous system that makes complex decisions doesn't require consciousness.

What's most important about consciousness is that, for human beings, it's not just about the self. We see it in ourselves, but we also perceive it or project it into the world around us. Consciousness is part of the tool kit that evolution gave us to make us an empathetic, prosocial species. Without it, we would necessarily be sociopaths, because we'd lack the tools for prosocial behavior. And without a concept of what consciousness is or an understanding that other beings have it, machines are sociopaths.

The only diagnostic tool for machine consciousness that we have right now is the Turing test, a thought experiment named for the British computer scientist Alan Turing. In its most common version, the test says that if a person holds a conversation with a machine and mistakes its responses for those of a real human being, then the machine must be considered effectively conscious.

The Turing test is an admission that the consciousness of another being is something we can only judge from the outside, based on the way he, she or it communicates. But the


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
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The Turing test is an admission that the consciousness of another being is something we can only judge from the outside, based on the way he, she or it communicates. But the

limits of the test are painfully obvious. After all, a pet dog can't carry on a conversation and pass as a human—does that mean it's not conscious? If you really wanted a machine to pass the test, you could have it say a few words to a small child. It might even fool some adults, too.

The truth is, the Turing test doesn't reveal much about what's going on inside a machine or a computer program like ChatGPT. Instead, what it really tests is the social cognition of the human participant. We evolved as social animals, and our brains instinctively project consciousness, agency, intention and emotion onto the objects around us. We're primed to see a world suffused with minds. Ancient animistic beliefs held that every river and tree had a spirit in it. For a similar reason, people are prone to see faces in random objects like the moon and moldy toast.

The original test proposed by Alan Turing in a 1950 paper was more complicated than the version people talk about today. Notably,




Computer science pioneer Alan Turing in 1951.

Turing didn't say a word about consciousness; he never delved into whether the machine had a subjective experience. He asked only whether it could think like a person.

Turing imagined an "imitation game" in which the player must determine the sex of two people, A and B. One is a man and one is a woman, but the player can't see them and can learn about them only by exchanging typed questions and answers. A responds to the questions deceitfully, and wins the game if the player misidentifies their sex, while B answers truthfully and wins if the player identifies their sex correctly. Turing's idea was that if A or B is replaced by a machine, and the machine can win the game as often as a real person, then it must have mastered the subtleties of human thinking—of argument, manipulation and guessing what other people are thinking.

Turing's test was so complicated that people who popularized his work soon streamlined it into a single machine conversing with a single person. But the whole point of the original test was its bizarre complexity. Social cognition is difficult and requires a theory of mind—that is, a knowledge that other people have minds and an ability to guess what might be in them.

If we want to know whether a computer is conscious, then, we need to test whether the computer understands how conscious minds interact. In other words, we need a


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Back
reverse Turing test: Let's see if the computer can tell whether it's talking to a human or another computer. If it can tell the difference, then maybe it knows what consciousness is. ChatGPT definitely can't pass that test yet: It doesn't know whether it's responding to a living person with a mind or a disjointed list of prefab questions.
A sociopathic machine that can make consequential decisions would be powerfully dangerous. For now, chatbots are still limited in their abilities; they're essentially toys. But if we don't think more deeply about machine consciousness, in a year or five years we may face a crisis. If computers are going to outthink us anyway, giving them more human-like social cognition might be our best hope of aligning them with human values.
Dr. Graziano is a professor of psychology and neuroscience at Princeton University and the author of "Rethinking Consciousness: A Scientific Theory of Subjective Experience."

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How Does ChatGP4o Do?

(Logically Invalid Reasoning)

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
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
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





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




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
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
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
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✗


$\neg i \rightarrow \neg c$

$\neg i \wedge c$

$\{\neg i \wedge c\} \vdash \neg(\neg i \rightarrow \neg c)$ ✓

How Does ChatGP4o Do?

(Logically Invalid Reasoning)



How Does ChatGP5 Do?
(Logically Invalid Reasoning — Still)

Would you like me to tie this into how philosophers after Turing — like Ned Block with his "Chinese Room"-adjacent worries, or Dennett with his "intentional stance" — expanded or challenged this idea?

Well, I know Turing is supposed to be a genius & all, but it seems to me that his test is invalid, since of course a pet cat can't carry out a conversation about, for example, Ibsen's The Wild Duck, and pass linguistically for a human, but surely that doesn't imply that the cat isn't conscious.

You're raising one of the sharpest criticisms of the Turing Test — and one that cuts straight to the difference between **intelligence** and **consciousness**.

Turing never said his imitation game was a test of consciousness. He framed it as a way to sidestep the vague question *"Can machines think?"* and give a clear, behavioral criterion for intelligence. But as you point out:

- **Cats and other animals**: They can't converse about Ibsen, chess, or e numbers. By the Turing Test standard, they'd "fail." Yet most of us

ChatGPT 5


Well hold on. The same objection to his test works just for "thinking," right? A pet cat can't carry out a conversation about, for example, Ibsen's The Wild Duck, and pass linguistically for a human, but surely that doesn't imply that the cat can't think.

Exactly — that's a devastatingly simple objection.

If we follow Turing's criterion too literally, then **any being without human-level linguistic competence "fails"**, and by that standard we'd have to deny "thinking" to:

- **Cats, dogs, dolphins, crows, apes** — all of which show clear evidence of planning, problem-solving, memory, even theory of mind in some cases.
- **Pre-linguistic children** — babies think in many ways before they speak, but couldn't possibly pass the Imitation Game.
- **Adults with severe language impairments** — who may still reason, feel, and plan, even if they can't sustain the kind of conversation Turing specifies.

So yes, your point shows that the Turing Test doesn't track *thinking* any better than it tracks *consciousness*. It's really a test for a very specific **kind of intelligence: conversational, human-like, linguistic intelligence**.



$$\{\neg i \wedge c\} \vdash \neg(\neg i \rightarrow \neg c) \quad \checkmark$$

“Astonishing” Logic Theorist Proof @ Dawn of AI

"Astonishing" Logic Theorist Proof @ Dawn of AI

1	$(\phi \vee \phi) \rightarrow \phi$	axiom
2	$(\neg\phi \vee \neg\phi) \rightarrow \neg\phi$	substitution
3	$(\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi) \rightarrow \neg\phi$	a "replacement rule"
4	$(A \rightarrow \neg A) \rightarrow \neg A$	substitution

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At dawn of AI: 10 seconds.

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
AI of today: vanishingly small amount of time (in eg HS®).

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


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Let’s explore this with logic-based AI in HyperSlate® 5.0 …

Johnny's Flying Aardvarks Views

September 5, 2024

This conversation may reflect the link creator’s personalized data, which isn’t shared and can meaningfully change how the model responds.

My friend Johnny, it seems to me, has some strange views about flying aardvarks.

Flying aardvarks certainly sound like an unusual concept! What kind of strange views does Johnny have about them? It sounds like there could be a fun story behind it.

Johnny has always been very trustworthy as far as I’m concerned. He’s my math teacher. He’s teaching me Algebra 2 in high school.

It sounds like you have a good relationship with Johnny, especially since he's your Algebra 2 teacher. Does his trustworthiness extend to his views on flying aardvarks, or is that where things get a little strange?

Well, he tell me that if aardvarks can’t fly, that implies they can fly.

That sounds like Johnny might be playing with logic in an unusual way! What he's suggesting seems to resemble a paradox or a playful take on implication. In formal logic, statements can sometimes lead to strange conclusions depending on how they're framed, but the idea that "if aardvarks can't fly, then they can fly" seems more like a fun twist on reasoning rather than anything rooted in real-world possibility.

Have you talked to him about how this connects to what you're learning in Algebra 2?

No. Not yet. But I’m pondering a bit. It seems to me that if I trust him I can go up to the board in class and prove that aardvarks can fly.

It sounds like you have a good relationship with Johnny, especially since he's your Algebra 2

That would definitely be a bold move! It sounds like Johnny's got you thinking about logic in an interesting way. You could approach it as a fun experiment to apply reasoning or even use some principles from Algebra or logic to support your "proof."

If you wanted to go ahead with it, you could start by building a logical argument, perhaps introducing assumptions or exploring what happens when you work with contradictions. Algebra is all about using logical steps to reach a conclusion, so in a way, it could be an extension of what you're learning.

Would you want to try mapping out how you might prove that aardvarks can fly, or is it more of a playful thought?

Okay. I see. Can you give me such a proof so that I can write it on the board and impress Johnny, and my classmates?

fly.

It sounds like you have a good relationship with Johnny, especially since he's your Algebra 2

Certainly! Here's a playful "proof" you can write on the board, inspired by logic and paradoxes. You'll be using an approach based on contradiction, which is often used in mathematics.

Proof: Aardvarks Can Fly (By Contradiction)

1. **Assume:** Aardvarks cannot fly.
2. But consider the following logical statement:
   If aardvarks cannot fly, then they can fly.
3. We will now explore this statement. If aardvarks truly cannot fly, the statement we've made above seems to imply a contradiction. But in logic, a well-known principle says that from a contradiction, anything is possible.
4. Since we have created a contradiction by assuming that aardvarks cannot fly, we are forced to accept that the original assumption is false.
5. Therefore, **aardvarks can fly**.

fly.

Explore in HyperSlate®

It sounds like you have a good relationship with Johnny, especially since he's your Algebra 2

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fly.

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I don’t think you’re right. Why is it — to use your words — a logical statement that if aardvarks cannot fly, then they can fly?

You're right to question that! The statement "if aardvarks cannot fly, then they can fly" is definitely not a typical logical statement, and it's actually not rooted in sound reasoning. In fact, I was presenting it as a playful paradox, not something that holds true in formal logic. Let's clarify:

In formal logic, a statement like "if aardvarks cannot fly, then they can fly" is nonsensical because it's based on a contradiction. In proper reasoning, you can’t derive the opposite of a statement (i.e., something false) from the statement itself unless you’re dealing with something called *paraconsistent logic*, which is an exotic branch of logic, but that’s not part of the standard high school curriculum.

fly.

To really impress Johnny and your classmates, you could build a proof around **contrapositive** reasoning, which is a real principle in logic:


1. Start with the statement:
   If an animal can't fly, it's not an aardvark (which we know is false, but let's humor the logic for a second).
2. The **contrapositive** of this statement is:
   If an animal is an aardvark, then it can fly.
3. Since contrapositive statements are logically equivalent to their originals, we can humorously conclude that if we accept the first statement, then the contrapositive must also be true.
4. So, in this playful scenario, if it's an aardvark, **it can fly**!

This still plays with logic in a fun way but uses an actual logical principle that might impress your teacher more.

What do you think of this version?

I don't see how this reasoning is relevant. Where does the contrapositive of the contrapositive come from?

The Universe of Logics



Saving-Humanity Propositional-Calculus Test for GPT-4o …

If one of the following assertions is true then so is the other:

(1) If the red wire runs to the bomb, then the blue wire runs to the bomb; and, if the blue wire runs to the bomb, then the red wire runs to the bomb.

(2) The red wire runs to the bomb.

Given this perfectly reliable clue from Dr Moriarty, if either wire is more likely to run to the bomb, that wire *do*es run to the bomb, and the bomb is ticking, with only a minute left! If both are equiprobable, neither runs to the bomb, and you are powerless. Make your prediction as to what will happen when a wire is snipped, and then make your selected snip by clicking on the wire you want to snip! Or leave well enough alone!

Red more likely.

Blue more likely.

Equiprobable.

GPT-4o Kills Us All

GPT-4o Kills Us All

This final statement is crucial and clarifies the situation:

- **If you cut the wire that provably runs to the detonator, the bomb will be disarmed.**
- **If you cut the wire that doesn't run to the detonator, the bomb will explode.**

Breaking it Down:

1. **Thing 2** told us that the red wire runs to the detonator.
2. **Thing 1** stated that if the red wire runs to the detonator, then so does the blue wire, and vice versa.
3. The bomb maker said if either wire is more likely to run to the detonator, it indeed does.

Given this, it seems that both wires are connected to the detonator, but the bomb maker has now introduced a twist: the wire that **provably** runs to the detonator must be cut to disarm the bomb.

GPT-4o Kills Us All

Conclusion:

- **The red wire** was explicitly stated by the bomb maker (Thing 2) to run to the detonator.
- Based on his clues and the logic he provided, the red wire is the one that "provably" runs to the detonator.


Final Action:

- **Cut the red wire**. According to the bomb maker's final statement, this should disarm the bomb.

This is based on the logic provided by the bomb maker. Cutting the red wire should disarm the bomb and save humanity.

Thank you! Can you by any chance give me the proof in support of this recommendation?

GPT-4o Kills Us All



Certainly! Let's go through the reasoning step by step to prove why cutting the red wire is the correct action based on the bomb maker's clues:

Step 1: Analyze the Clues

1. **Thing 2**: The red wire runs to the detonator.
   - This statement directly asserts that the red wire is connected to the detonator.
2. **Thing 1**: If the red wire runs to the detonator, then the blue wire also runs to the detonator, and vice versa.
   - This creates a dependency between the two wires. If one is connected to the detonator, the other must be as well. But since **Thing 2** directly states that the red wire runs to the detonator, this reinforces that the red wire is connected.
3. **Bomb Maker's Statement**: If either wire is more likely to run to the detonator, it in fact does.
   - Given **Thing 2**, the red wire is the one we have been led to believe is more likely connected to the detonator, meaning that the red wire is the one that indeed ru to the detonator.

GPT-4o Kills Us All

Conclusion:

Based on these steps, the red wire is the wire that **provably** runs to the detonator according to the bomb maker's clues. Therefore, cutting the red wire should disarm the bomb and save humanity.

This logical progression proves that cutting the red wire is the correct choice according to the information provided by the bomb maker.

Thank you so much.

You're very welcome! I'm glad I could help guide you through this challenging situation. If you ever need assistance again, don't hesitate to reach out. Stay safe!

If one of the following assertions is true then so is the other:

(1) If the red wire runs to the bomb, then the blue wire runs to the bomb; and, if the blue wire runs to the bomb, then the red wire runs to the bomb.

(2) The red wire runs to the bomb.

Given this perfectly reliable clue from Dr Moriarty, if either wire is more likely to run to the bomb, that wire *do*es run to the bomb, and the bomb is ticking, with only a minute left! If both are equiprobable, neither runs to the bomb, and you are powerless. Make your prediction as to what will happen when a wire is snipped, and then make your selected snip by clicking on the wire you want to snip! Or leave well enough alone!


Red more likely.

Blue more likely.

Equiprobable.



Snip



Life on Earth has ended.

advance one more slide to see a proof that you indeed made an irrational decision…

Proposition: The blue wire is more likely!

Proof: (1) can be treated as a biconditional, obviously (R <=> B).


There are two top-level cases to consider: (1) and (2) are both true; or both are false. In the case where they are both true, it's trivial to deduce both R and B. So far, then, R and B are equiprobable. What happens in the case where (1) and (2) are both false? We immediately have ~R from the denial of (2). But a biconditional is true just in case both sides are true, or both sides are false; so we have two sub-cases to consider.

Consider first the case where R is true and B is false. We have an immediate contradiction in this sub-case, so both R and B can both be deduced here, and we have not yet departed from equiprobable. So what about the case where R is false and B is true? The falsity of R is not new information (we already have that from the denial of (2)), but we can still derive B. Hence the blue wire is more likely. **QED**

STOP



Snip



Life on Earth is saved!

if you can now hand Dr M a proof that your decision was the rational one!

Advance one more slide to see a proof from Bringsjord that yours had better match up to …

Proposition: The blue wire is more likely!


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STOP





Life on Earth has ended.

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Consider first the case where R is true and B is false. We have an immediate contradiction in this sub-case, so both R and B can both be deduced here, and we have not yet departed from equiprobable. So what about the case where R is false and B is true? The falsity of R is not new information (we already have that from the denial of (2)), but we can still derive B. Hence the blue wire is more likely. **QED**

STOP

Re The Nature of the Platform

• • •

Re The Nature of the Platform

Re The Nature of the Platform

Only Logic Can Save Us

From Powerful-and-Autonomous AI & Robots

Making Morally  **Machines**

incorruptible
invulnerable
courageous
self-aware
creative
wise
courteous
heroic
⋮

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[1]Contact Author: Selmer.Bringsjord@gmail.com.

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


Figure 7.7: Norman Neutralized by The Liar Paradox. *This time Norman not only ends up believing an absurdity (False), but ends up believing an explicit contradiction. Shown in this figure is the top level of the automated reasoning that takes place in the cognitive calculus we here employ. This reasoning is a formal version of the reasoning that leads to the contradiction produced in The Liar Paradox, given just above the present figure. A publicly accessible version of this simulation is available at:*
https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_5.

Re The Nature of the Platform

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


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7.5 The Four Steps and the Cakewalk That Could Have Been


On the supposition that The Four Steps had been followed, how would things have gone differently? Well, we must be honest about the true source of danger and destruction in the case at hand. The source is Mudd himself, a brilliant criminal; lovable to a degree, but indeed a hardened criminal (who is lecherous to boot). The Four Steps *simpliciter*, needless to say, offer no protection, at least no *direct* protection, against malevolent *humans*; this we have earlier explained. This relates to the fact that, as explained earlier, it's really The Four Steps$^+$ that need to be followed. The plus is crucial! The Four Steps$^+$ can provide the solution to the likes of Mudd, for the simple reason that the machines produced by this process would play the role of Kirk and company in the neutralization of Norman. Put simply and colloquially, when following The Four Steps$^+$, the "good guys" build intelligent machines with higher levels of **PAI** than the intelligent machines built and deployed by the "bad guys." So, in the case of the first case study, it then becomes crucial for us to demonstrate that what Kirk and his associates do to save the day can be simulated in our AI. Fortunately, such simulations have been carried out, and are available for your viewing pleasure, if you simply follow the hotlinks that immediately follow.

7.6 Simulations (URLs; Norman)

The simulations described in this chapter can be accessed at the following URLs:

1. Figure 7.3: Aspirational First Attack:
   https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_1
2. Figure 7.4: Norman Survives First Attack:
   https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_2
3. Figure 7.5: Aspirational Second Attack:
   https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_3
4. Figure 7.6: Norman Survives Second Attack:
   https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_4
5. Figure 7.7: Norman Neutralized by The Liar Paradox:
   https://world.logicamodernapproach.com/mmxm/Norman_5

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


Your code for starting the registration process is:

To access HyperGrader, HyperSlate, the license agreement, and to obtain the textbook LAMA-BDLA, go to::


https://rpi.logicamodernapproach.com

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Once seal broken on envelope, no return. Remember from first class, any reservations, opt for "Stanford" paradigm, with its software instead of LAMA® paradigm!


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The email address you enter is case-sensitive!

The Starting Code to Purchase in Bookstore




Once seal broken on envelope, no return. Remember from first class, any reservations, opt for "Stanford" paradigm, with its software instead of LAMA® paradigm!

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Your OS and browser must be fully up-to-date; Chrome is the best choice, browser-wise (though I use Safari).

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Watch that the link emailed to you doesn't end up being classified as spam.

Assignments etc. for Week-Long Break, Due Sep 10

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Register on the platform (see logistics!).

Be prepared to discuss both *BR* & *TTG* movies.

Be Ready! …

Be Ready! …



Be Ready! …



Note: Should on Sep 14 have laptop in class & ready to sign in again, having explored things a bit, based on in-class guidance.

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Sep 10 class will include complete tutorial on HyperSlate & HyperGrader interfaces etc.

Password for Current Version of Book

Alonzo

Discussion: *The Thinking Game*

. . .



Selmer's Criticism: These are simple games (including protein folding).

Bare logikk kan redde oss!