Should every BS degree require its recipient to demonstrate understanding of ...

Selmer Bringsjord*

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4/19/2021



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Note: This is a version designed for those who have had at least one robust, proof-intensive university-level course in formal logic to the level of \mathscr{L}_2 .

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Background Context ...

Gödel's Great Theorems (OUP)

- Introduction ("The Wager")
- Brief Preliminaries (e.g. the propositional calculus & FOL)
- The Completeness Theorem
- The First Incompleteness Theorem
- The Second Incompleteness Theorem
- The Speedup Theorem
- The Continuum-Hypothesis Theorem
- The Time-Travel Theorem
- Gödel's "God Theorem"
- Could a Finite Machine Match Gödel's Greatness?



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A corollary of the First Incompleteness Theorem: We cannot prove (in classical mathematics) that mathematics is consistent.

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
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
By far the greatest of GGT; Selm's analysis based Sherlock Holmes' mystery "Silver Blaze."






Douglas R. Hofstadter

A metaphorical fugue on minds and machines in the spirit of Lewis Carroll









an Eternal Golden Braid



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A metaphorical fugue on minds and machines in the spirit of Lewis Carroll



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


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


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"Well, uh, hmm, ..."

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
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
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
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
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



The Liar Paradox

















Paul Erdős



"The Book"





Paul Erdős



Ergo, step one: What is LP?

"The Book"

"The (Economical) Liar"

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L: This sentence is false.

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Suppose that T(L); then $\neg T(L)$.

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Suppose that T(L); then $\neg T(L)$. Suppose that $\neg T(L)$ then T(L).

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Hence: T(L) iff (i.e., if & only if) $\neg T(L)$.

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Contradiction!

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Suppose that \overline{P} is true. Then we can immediately deduce that \overline{P} is provable, because here is a proof: $\overline{P} \to \overline{P}$ is an easy theorem, and from it and our supposition we deduce \overline{P} by modus ponens. But since what \overline{P} says is that it's unprovable, we have deduced that \overline{P} is false under our initial supposition.

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Suppose on the other hand that \overline{P} is false. Then we can immediately deduce that \overline{P} is unprovable: Suppose for *reductio* that \overline{P} is provable; then \overline{P} holds as a result of some proof, but what \overline{P} says is that it's unprovable; and so we have contradiction. But since what \overline{P} says is that it's unprovable, and we have just proved that under our supposition, we arrive at the conclusion that \overline{P} is true.

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
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
All of this is fishy; but Gödel transformed it into utterly precise, impactful, indisputable reasoning ...


PA (Peano Arithmetic):


 $\begin{array}{ll} \mathrm{A1} & \forall x (0 \neq s(x)) \\ \mathrm{A2} & \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y) \\ \mathrm{A3} & \forall x (x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y (x = s(y))) \\ \mathrm{A4} & \forall x (x + 0 = x) \\ \mathrm{A5} & \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y)) \\ \mathrm{A6} & \forall x (x \times 0 = 0) \\ \mathrm{A7} & \forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x) \end{array}$

And, every sentence that is the universal closure of an instance of $([\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(s(x))] \rightarrow \forall x\phi(x)))$ where $\phi(x)$ is open wff with variable x, and perhaps others, free.










Problem: How do we enable a formula to refer to other formulae and itself (and also other objects like proofs, terms etc.), in a perfectly consistent way?

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Solution: Gödel numbering!

$$\phi \\ \phi \to \psi \\ f(x, a)$$

Object-level objects in the language of \mathcal{L}_1

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Gödel Numbering, the Easy Way

Just realize that every entry in a dictionary is named by a number n, and by the same basic lexicographic ordering, every computer program, formula, etc. is named by a number m in a lexicographic ordering going from 1, to 2, to ...

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So, gimcrack is named by some positive integer k. Hence, I can just refer to this word as "k" Or in the notation I prefer: $k^{gimcrack}$.

Just realize that every entry in a dictionary is named by a number n, and by the same basic lexicographic ordering, every computer program, formula, etc. is named by a number m in a lexicographic ordering going from 1, to 2, to ...

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Or, every syntactically valid computer program in Clojure that you will ever write can be uniquely denoted by some number m in the lexicographic ordering of all syntactically valid such programs. So your program π can just be coded as a numeral m^{π} in a formal language that captures arithmetic (i.e., an *arithmetic language*).

Let Φ be a set of arithmetic sentences that is

(i) consistent (i.e. no contradiction $\phi \land \neg \phi$ can be deduced from Φ);

(ii) s.t. an algorithm is available to decide whether or not a given string *u* is a member of Φ; and
(iii) sufficiently expressive to capture all of the operations of a standard computing machine (e.g. a Turing machine, register machine, KU machine, etc.).

Then there is an "undecidable" arithmetic sentence \mathscr{G} from Gödel that can't be proved from Φ , nor can the negation of this sentence (i.e. $\neg \mathscr{G}$) be proved from Φ !

Alas, that's painfully verbose.

Suppose $\Phi \supset \mathbf{PA}$ that is

(i) Con Φ;
(ii) Turing-decidable, and
(iii) sufficiently expressive to capture all of the operations of a Turing machine (i.e. Repr Φ).

Then there is an arithmetic sentence \mathcal{G} s.t. $\Phi \nvDash \mathcal{G}$ and $\Phi \nvDash \neg \mathcal{G}$.

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Remember Church's Theorem!

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To prove GI, we shall allow ourselves ...

The Fixed Point Theorem (FPT)

Assume that Φ is a set of arithmetic sentences such that Repr Φ . There for every arithmetic formula $\psi(x)$ with one free variable x, there is an arithmetic sentence ϕ s.t.

 $\Phi \vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \psi(n^{\phi}).$

We can intuitively understand ϕ to be saying: ''I have the property ascribed to me by the formula ψ .''

"I thought there was no free lunch!"

[W]e "would hope that such a deep theorem would have an insightful proof. No such luck. I am going to write down a sentence ... and verify that it works. What I won't do is give you a satisfactory explanation for why I write down the particular formula that I do. I write down the formula become Gödel wrote down the formula, and Gödel wrote down the formula because, when he played the logic game he was able to see seven or eight moves ahead, whereas you and I are only able to see one or two moves ahead. I don't know anyone who thinks he has a fully satisfying understanding of why the Self-referential Lemma [= FPT] works. It has a rabbit-out-of-a-hat quality for everyone."

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
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
Ok; so let's do it ...

(Repr*) = (1) Thm(n^{ϕ}) if and only if $\Phi \vdash \phi$.

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(FPT*) = (2) $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$ if and only if $\neg \text{Thm}(n^{\mathscr{G}})$.





Here, ϕ is of course a variable in (1) for any formula. Now suppose $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$. By right-to-left on (1) we deduce Thm $(n^{\mathscr{G}}) = \neg \neg$ Thm $(n^{\mathscr{G}})$. Then by *modus tollens* $\Phi \nvDash \mathscr{G}$, by right-to-left on (2). Contradiction!

(Repr*) = (1) Thm(
$$n^{\phi}$$
) if and only if $\Phi \vdash \phi$.
(FPT*) = (2) $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$ if and only if \neg Thm($n^{\mathscr{G}}$).

Here, ϕ is of course a variable in (1) for any formula. Now suppose $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$. By right-to-left on (1) we deduce Thm $(n^{\mathscr{G}}) = \neg \neg$ Thm $(n^{\mathscr{G}})$. Then by *modus tollens* $\Phi \nvDash \mathscr{G}$, by right-to-left on (2). Contradiction!

Suppose on the other hand $\Phi \vdash \neg \mathscr{G}$; and suppose for *reductio* that $\neg \text{Thm}(n^{\mathscr{G}})$. From the second of these suppositions, right-to-left on (2), we have $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$. But this entails lnc Φ . Yet our original assumptions include Con Φ , so: contradiction. Hence we have $\text{Thm}(n^{\mathscr{G}})$. But from this, left-to-right on (1), we have $\Phi \vdash \mathscr{G}$. But then we have a contradiction with (i) = Con Φ ! **QED**

"Silly abstract nonsense! There aren't any concrete examples of \mathcal{G} !"

Ah, but e.g.: Goodstein's Theorem!

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The Goodstein Sequence goes to zero!

Pure base *n* representation of a number *r*

• Represent *r* as only sum of powers of *n* in which the exponents are also powers of *n*, etc.


$$266 = 2^{2^{(2^{2^{0}}+2^{0})}} + 2^{(2^{2^{0}}+2^{0})} + 2^{2^{0}}$$

Grow Function

 $Grow_k(n)$:

- 1. Take the pure base k representation of n
- 2. Replace all k by k + 1. Compute the number obtained.
- 3. Subtract one from the number

Example of Grow Grow₂(19)



 $3^{3^{3^{3^{0}}}} + 3^{3^{0}} + 3^{0} - 1$


7625597484990


Goodstein Sequence


• For any natural number *m*


m $Grow_2(m)$ $Grow_3(Grow_2(m))$ $Grow_4(Grow_3(Grow_2(m))),$

•••










m									
2	2	2	Ι	0					
3	3	3	3	2	I	0			
4	4	26	41	60	83	109	139	 11327 (96th term)	

m										
2	2	2	Ι	0						
3	3	3	3	2	I	0				
4	4	26	41	60	83	109	139		11327 (96th term)	
5	15	~1013	~10155	~10 ²¹⁸⁵	~1036306	10695975	1015151337	•••		

This sequence actually goes to zero!


Astrologic:

Rational Aliens Will be on the Same "Race Track"!




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Could an AI Ever Match Gödel's GI & G2?

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by Selmer Bringsjord

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- The Completeness Theorem
- The First Incompleteness Theorem
- The Second Incompleteness Theorem
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Med nok penger, kan logikk løse alle problemer.