Rebuilding the Foundations of Math via (the "Theory") <u>ZFC;</u> ZFC to Axiomatized Arithmetic (the "Theory" <u>PA</u>)

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Reviewing the situation

 $\bullet \quad \bullet \quad \bullet$

Types of Paradoxes

- Deductive Paradoxes paradoxes arrived at via deducing a contradiction from a set of assumptions. (Russell's Paradox)
- Inductive Paradoxes coming (e.g.The Lottery Paradox, The Raven Paradox, The St Petersburg Paradox)

Dear colleague,

For a year and a half I have been acquainted with your Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but it is only now that I have been able to find the time for the thorough study I intended to make of your work. I find myself in complete agreement with you in all essentials, particularly when you reject any psychological element [[Moment]] in logic and when you place a high value upon an ideography [Begriffsschrift]] for the foundations of mathematics and of formal logic, which, incidentally, can hardly be distinguished. With regard to many particular questions, I find in your work discussions, distinctions, and definitions that one seeks in vain in the works of other logicians. Especially so far as function is concerned (§ 9 of your Begriffsschrift), I have been led on my own to views that are the same even in the details. There is just one point where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [[p. 23 above]]) that a function, too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must conclude that w is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a definable collection [[Menge]] does not form a totality.

I am on the point of finishing a book on the principles of mathematics and in it I should like to discuss your work very thoroughly.¹ I already have your books or shall buy them soon, but I would be very grateful to you if you could send me reprints of your articles in various periodicals. In case this should be impossible, however, I will obtain them from a library.

The exact treatment of logic in fundamental questions, where symbols fail, has remained very much behind; in your works I find the best I know of our time, and therefore I have permitted myself to express my deep respect to you. It is very regrettable that you have not come to publish the second volume of your *Grund*gesetze; I hope that this will still be done.

Very respectfully yours,

BERTRAND RUSSELL

The above contradiction, when expressed in Peano's ideography, reads as follows:

 $w = \operatorname{cls} \cap x \, \mathfrak{s}(x \sim \varepsilon \, x) \, \mathfrak{i}(x \sim \varepsilon \, w) = w = w = w$

Axiom V $\exists x \forall y [y \in x \leftrightarrow \phi(y)]$

For formulae Φ with a free variable y, there exists a set x such that iff y is a member of x then formula Φ holds.

Russell's Theorem

$$\vdash \neg \exists x \forall y (y \in x \leftrightarrow y \notin y)$$

NO, if we take Φ to be the formula $y \notin y$ (y is not a member of itself), we are able to prove a contradiction!

You will have the honor of proving this contradiction in Hyperslate as homework...

FregTHEN2	
KnightKnave_SmullyanKKPro blem1.1	RussellsLetter2Frege
thenCfromAthenBandBthen	The challenge here is to prove that from Russell's instantiation of Frege's doomed Axiom V a contradiction can be promptly derived. The letter has of course been examined in some detail by S Bringsjord (in the Mar 16 2020 lecture in the 2020 lecture lineup); it, along with an astoundingly soft-spoken reply from Frege, can be found here. Put meta-logically, your task in the present problem is to build a proof that confirms this: $\{\exists x \forall y((y \in x) \rightarrow (y \notin y))\} \vdash \zeta \land \neg \zeta.$ Make sure you understand that the given here is an instantiation of Frege's Axiom V; i.e. it's an instantiation of $\exists x \forall y((y \in x) \rightarrow \phi(y)).$
iconditionalIntroByChaining	
BogusBiconditional	
CheatersNeverPropser	
Contrapositive_NYS_2	
Disj_Syll	
GreenCheeseMoon2	
HypSyll	(The notation $\phi(y)$, recall, is the standard way in mathematical logic to say that y is free in ϕ .) Note : Your finished proof is allowed to make use the PC-provability oracle (but <i>only</i> that oracle).
LarrylsSomehowSmart	
Modus_Tollens	
RussellsLetter2Frege	 (Now a brief remark on matters covered by in class by Bringsjord when second-order logic = L₂ arrives on the scene: Longer term, and certainly constituting evidence of Frege's capacity for ingenius, intricate deduction, it has recently been realized that while Frege himself relied on Axiom V to obtain what is known as Hume's Principle (= HP), this reliance is avoidable. That from just HP we can deduce all of Peano Arithmetic (PA) (!) is a result Frege can be credited with showing; the result is known today as Frege's Theorem (= FT). Following the link just given will reward the reader with an understanding of HP, and how how to obtain PA from it.) Deadline 22 Apr 2020 23:59:00 EST
ThxForThePCOracle	
Explosion	
OnlyMediumOrLargeLlamas	
GreenCheeseMoon1	
Disj_Elim	
kok13_28	
KingAce2	
kok_13_31	

The Foundation Crumbles



Axiom V
$$\exists x \forall y [y \in x \leftrightarrow \phi(y)]$$

a formula of arbitrary size in which the variable y is free; this formula ascribes a property to y

The Foundation Crumbles

The Rest of Math, Engineering, etc.

Foundation

Axiom V etc.

Axiom V
$$\exists x \forall y [y \in x \leftrightarrow \phi(y)]$$

a formula of arbitrary size in which the variable y is free; this formula ascribes a property to y

It's not just Russell's Paradox that destroys naïve set theory:

Richard's Paradox ...



Definition of Richard's N:

"The real number whose whole part is zero, and whose *n*-th decimal is *p* plus one if the *n*-th decimal of the real number defined by the *n*-th member of *E* is *p* and *p* is neither eight nor nine, and is simply one if this *n*-th decimal is eight or nine."

Proof: N is defined by a finite string taken from the English alphabet, so N is in the sequence E. But on the other hand, by definition of N, for every m, N differs from the m-th element of E in at least one decimal place; so N is not any element of E. Contradiction! **QED**

The Foundation Rebuilt The Rest of Math, Engineering, etc. Arithmetic **New Foundation** ZFC

So what are the axioms in ZFC?

Axiom Schema of Separation (SEP)

SEP

 $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_k \forall x \exists y \forall z [z \in y \leftrightarrow (z \in x \land \phi(z, x_1, \dots, x_k))]$

where x and y are distinct, and are both distinct from z and the x_i ; and, as usual for us now, ϕ expresses a property using \in .

"Given beforehand some set x and property \mathscr{P} captured by a formula ϕ that uses \in for its relation, the set y composed of $\{z \in x : \mathscr{P}(z)\}$ exists."

> How does this neutralize Russell's letter to Frege?

How does this neutralize Russell's letter to Frege?

"Given beforehand some set x and property \mathscr{P} captured by a formula ϕ that uses \in for its relation, the set y composed of $\{z \in x : \mathscr{P}(z)\}$ exists."

• This is a much stronger statement than axiom V!

Russell's paradox can be rephrased as saying the existence of the set of all sets leads to a contradiction.

Axiom V implies the existence of the set of all sets. Axiom V leads to a contradiction.

SEP only allows us to define new sets in terms of pre-existing sets, thus avoiding the existence of the set of all sets.

As an exercise: Try using $z \notin z$ for P(z)

Formal Natural-Number Arithmetic ...

Q (= Robinson Arithmetic)

Define the existence of natural numbers and their relationships to each other

Defines addition on natural numbers

Defines multiplication on natural numbers $\begin{array}{ll} \mathrm{A1} & \forall x (0 \neq s(x)) \\ \mathrm{A2} & \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y) \\ \mathrm{A3} & \forall x (x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y (x = s(y))) \\ \mathrm{A4} & \forall x (x + 0 = x) \\ \mathrm{A5} & \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y)) \\ \mathrm{A6} & \forall x (x \times 0 = 0) \\ \mathrm{A7} & \forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x) \end{array}$

Notation in the Q Axioms: Quantification

The "Domain of discourse" in Q is the natural numbers.

0, I, 2, 3, 4

This means quantifiers range exclusively over them

"∀x, …" reads as: "For any number x …" "For all numbers…"

"∃x, …" reads as: "There exists a number x such that …" "There is a number such that …"

Notation in the Q Axioms: Successors

Robinson arithmetic defines the natural numbers in terms of their successors, denoted by the successor function *s*.

s takes a number x and returns the next number (x+I)

Thus in robinson arithmetic the natural numbers are written solely in terms of 0 and successors of 0:

$$0 = 0$$

$$I = s(0)$$

$$2 = s(s(0))$$

$$3 = s(s(s(0)))$$

$$4 = s(s(s(s(0))))$$

This successor notion allows for a compact axiomatization of the natural numbers.

A1 $\forall x (0 \neq s(x))$

- 0 is not the successor of any natural number
- All numbers' successors are not equal to 0.

Natural Numbers Numbers start at 0!

A2
$$\forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y)$$

• For any two numbers, if their successors are equal, than they are equal.

Simple Example: 7 = 7 thus 6 = 6 thus $5 = 5 \dots$

Why do we care, can't we just use Equality-Intro? No! This allows us to make more complex statements...

imagine we have a statement containing free variables "s(s(p)) = s(q)", from this we could derive "s(p) = q", Which we couldn't do with raw equality intro.

A3
$$\forall x(x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y(x = s(y)))$$

• For all numbers x, if x does not equal zero, then there exists another number y such that x is the successor of y.

In simpler terms...

• For any number that is not zero, there exists some number that comes before it.

Yes! If x = 1, y = 0; x = 2, y = 1, etc etc

We will prove a better form of A3 as an exercise from this version...

The Addition Axioms

A4 $\forall x(x+0=x)$

Anything plus zero is itself.

A5
$$\forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y))$$

Any x plus the successor of y is the successor of x plus y

In other words...

x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

Interlude: Axioms and Meaning

What do we mean when you say the axioms *define* addition?

A common confusion: "I see a + sign inside the axioms! Therefore, addition must be defined before the axioms, and you are just writing obvious properties about it!"

A4
$$\forall x(x+0=x)$$

A5 $\forall x \forall y(x+s(y)=s(x+y))$

"+" in this context is just a symbol denoting a function of two numbers, we could just as well write "x + y" as a(x, y).

By defining properties of how the symbol may be used in reasoning we are constricting the symbol + to behave as addition, imbuing it with the intuitive "meaning" of addition.

A6
$$\forall x(x \times 0 = 0)$$

A7 $\forall x \forall y(x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x)$

Defining multiplication:

Anything times 0 is 0.

Any number x times the successor of y is x times y plus x

I.E

a(b + I) = ab + a

Open Formulae?

We've already seen it in our coverage of ZFC.

$$\exists y[s(s(0)) \times y = s(s(s(s(0))))]$$

This says what?

That 2 multiplied by some number yields 4. But this is very specific: the successor of the successor of zero is specifically 2. Here then is the general case with an "open" wff:

$$\exists y[s(s(0)) \times y = x]$$

This open wff $\phi(x)$ expresses the arithmetic property 'even.'

PA (Peano Arithmetic)

A1
$$\forall x(0 \neq s(x))$$

A2 $\forall x \forall y(s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x = y)$
A3 $\forall x(x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y(x = s(y)))$
A4 $\forall x(x + 0 = x)$
A5 $\forall x \forall y(x + s(y) = s(x + y))$
A6 $\forall x(x \times 0 = 0)$
A7 $\forall x \forall y(x \times s(y) = (x \times y) + x)$

• •

And, every sentence that is the universal closure of an instance of $([\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(s(x))] \rightarrow \forall x\phi(x)))$

where $\phi(x)$ is open wff with variable x, and perhaps others, free.

What is this large scary formula?

 $([\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \to \phi(s(x))] \to \forall x\phi(x)))$

Axiom schema of induction!

Gives us a very powerful tool for proving statements about all natural numbers.

You can say something is true about all natural number if you can first show that it is true for 0 and that it being true for an arbitrary number n implies it is true for n+1.

Domino Analogy for Induction

 $([\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \to \phi(s(x))] \to \forall x\phi(x))$

Let $\phi(x)$ be the statement: "The nth domino has been knocked over"

If the first domino is knocked over $\phi(0)$ and for all dominos, each one will knock over its successor $\forall x(\phi(x) \rightarrow \phi(s(x)))$

then all dominos have been knocked over

 $\forall x \phi(x)$



Example Proof by Induction

$$\forall n: \sum_{i=0}^n i = \frac{n(n+1)}{2}$$

As a "forall natural numbers" statement, we can try using the induction schema to prove it!

Let $\phi(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{x} i = \frac{x(x+1)}{2}$.

We must first prove the first domino falls, this is called the base case, i.e. $\phi(0)$.

$$\sum_{i=0}^{0} i = \frac{0(0+1)}{2} \to 0 = 0$$

We must now prove that if the statement is true for one number it will be true for the next number: $\forall x : \phi(x) \to \phi(x+1)$. This is called the inductive step.

We can prove $\forall x : \phi(x) \to \phi(x+1)$ by proving $\phi(x) \to \phi(x+1)$ for this arbitrary x and using \forall introduction. We will use a direct proof for $\phi(x) \to \phi(x+1)$, proving $\phi(x+1)$ using $\phi(x)$ as an assumption. $\phi(x)$ is called the "induction hypothesis".

$$\sum_{i=0}^{x+1} i = \frac{(x+1)((x+1)+1)}{2}$$
$$\sum_{i=0}^{x} i + x + 1 = \frac{(x+1)((x+1)+1)}{2}$$
$$\frac{x(x+1)}{2} + x + 1 = \frac{(x+1)((x+1)+1)}{2}$$
by $\phi(x)$

Brush up on your highschool arithmetic by finishing the equivalence proof...



 $([\phi(0) \land \forall x(\phi(x) \to \phi(s(x))] \to \forall x\phi(x)))$

We have $\phi(0)$ and $\forall x : \phi(x) \to \phi(x+1)$ therefore, by induction (the induction axiom) $\phi(n)$ holds for all n.



Pop Quiz #1

Pull out a piece of paper and write down if the following formulae are open or closed. If they are open, list the unbound variable(s).

$$\exists y[s(s(0)) \times y = x]$$

2)
$$s(s(0)) + s(0) = s(s(s(0)))$$

3)
$$\exists y[s(s(0)) \times y = s(s(s(s(0))))]$$

4)
$$s(a) = s(s(0))$$

5)
$$\forall x : x = 0 \lor (\exists y : x = s(y))$$

6)
$$\sum_{i=0}^{x+1} i = \frac{(x+1)((x+1)+1)}{2}$$

Pop Quiz #2

Create an FOL workspace in hyperslate named 311pop2. Using A3 we have provided as a given:

A3
$$\forall x(x \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists y(x = s(y)))$$

Prove that a natural number is either 0 or the successor of another natural number. No oracles.

$$\forall x : x = 0 \lor (\exists y : x = s(y))$$

(This is an alternative formulation of axiom 3)

If you finish early, prove the other direction. Use the previous goal as an assumption and derive A3.







Pop Quiz #3: Basic Addition

Use A4 and A5 to prove 1+2 = 3. Do this in a new FOL workspace named 311pop3



Slutten

(Norwegian for "End")