

Propositional Calculus III:

Reductio ad Absurdum

(negation intro & negation elimination in HS[®])

Selmer Bringsjord

Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
Department of Cognitive Science
Department of Computer Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy, New York 12180 USA

Intro to Formal Logic (& AI)
2/9/2026



(Confessedly Redundant)
Logistics ...

The Starting Code to Purchase in Bookstore


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Your code for starting the registration process is:

To access HyperGrader, HyperSlate, the license agreement,
and to obtain the textbook LAMA-BDLA, go to::


<https://rpi.logicamodernapproach.com>

The Starting Code to Purchase in Bookstore



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
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


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
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Watch that the link emailed to you doesn't end up being classified as spam.

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
First prop. calc. (Exercise) Problem:
switching_conjuncts_fine



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First prop. calc. (Exercise) Problem:
switching_conjuncts_fine

Second prop. calc. (Exercise) Problem:
switching_disjuncts_fine



E-Housekeeping Pts, Redux

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- Must input your RIN. (This is your ID at your university.)

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- Make sure browser fully up-to-date.
- Chrome best (but I use Safari :)).
- Always work in the *same* browser window with multiple tabs; must do this with email and HyperGrader[®] & HyperSlate[®].

Logic-and-AI in the News, & R&D ...

On AI/robotics & Jobs ...

As Robots Disemploy Us & AIs Buy Us, They Steal Our Dignity; What Is To Be Done?

short-paper submission to Robophilosophy 2026

version 0206262357NY

Abstract

Kant held that human persons can never have a “market price.” While the merely instrumental goods humans purchase in the market have their prices set by the vicissitudes of supply, demand, and — in controlled economies — edict, according to Kant, humans themselves have a singular kind of intrinsic *dignity* (*Würde*). Whether or not Kant is correct, and without question there is disagreement about what human dignity consists in and what grounds it, there is by our lights undeniably a *core conception* of human dignity as arising from human exceptionalism — a conception that 21st-century robotics and AI appear to be turning on its head. AI/robotics is achieving this by not only increasingly disemploying human workers in general, but specifically by steadily advancing toward a time when AIs, in the few cases where human labor rates are so low that AIs and robots cannot compete, will auction off these jobs for the lowest possible price. Such a “double whammy” has not to our knowledge been prophesied by exuberant Singularitarians, but by mainstream, prominent economists who have seemingly level-headed beliefs about the comparative capabilities of artificial versus natural intelligence. We show that anyone seeking to uphold human dignity as the future unfolds cannot find the current trajectory of robotics and AI to be savory. And we suggest at least one course of action that should be pursued now in light of what is coming. This course is in fact by our lights confessedly a panacea — but it is not one easily achieved, to put it mildly. We wrap up by anticipating some objections, rebutting them, and offering a few final remarks.

***Affiliation:** Cognitive Science^{1,2}; Computer Science¹; Lally School of Management^{1,2}; RPI; Troy NY 12180 USA; Selmer.Bringsjord@gmail.com; bringa@rpi.edu.

On AI/robotics & Jobs ...

On AI/robotics & Jobs ...

OPINION
BINYAMIN APPELBAUM

Trump Wants More Jobs for Americans. He's Getting More Robots Instead.

Feb. 9, 2026, 5:00 a.m. ET



By **Binyamin Appelbaum**
Opinion writer

Most American dairy cows are milked by immigrants. On Dale Hemminger's farm in upstate New York, the cows are milked by robots. When a cow wants to be milked, it walks up to a machine that cleans its udder, attaches cups to its teats, draws the milk and dispenses a treat.

In a barn that Mr. Hemminger plans to open this year, other robots will roam the floor like little automated pooper scoopers, picking up manure.


President Trump should pay a visit. He might learn something about the limits of his plan to improve the fortunes of American workers by forcing immigrants to leave the country.

There is a big hole in the seductively simple argument that Mr. Trump's policy will push employers to hire Americans: For many jobs, the cheaper and more likely replacement is a robot. And the jobs that can't be done by robots? Many will simply leave the country.


**Formal Logic to Measure Hardness of Jobs,
With an Eye to Job Displacement by AIs ...**




Demandingness of Jobs





Demandingness of Jobs



Demandingness of Jobs






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


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

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



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

Polynomial Hierarchy

Demandingness of Jobs





Polynomial Hierarchy

Demandingness of Jobs



Polynomial Hierarchy



Demandingness of Jobs



Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy

Demandingness of Jobs





Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy

Demandingness of Jobs





Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

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Demandingness of Jobs





Analytic Hierarchy

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Demandingness of Jobs



Analytic Hierarchy

Arithmetic Hierarchy



Exponential Hierarchy



Turing

Polynomial Hierarchy

Demandingness of Jobs



Analytic Hierarchy

Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy





Church



Turing

Demandingness of Jobs



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



Church





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

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

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

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
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
Demandingness of Jobs



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Demandingness of Jobs



Analytic Hierarchy

Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy

Aristotle+



Church

Pro Checkers/Chess/Go;
EXPTIME




Turing

Dockworking; NP-Complete

a h



Demandingness of Jobs



Analytic Hierarchy

Aristotle⁺

Arithmetic Hierarchy



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Pro Checkers/Chess/Go;
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Exponential Hierarchy



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
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Analytic Hierarchy



Aristotle⁺

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Church



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
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Dockworking; NP-Complete

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Aristotle⁺



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Turing

Dockworking; NP-Complete

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Polynomial Hierarchy

a h

Demandingness of Jobs

The job-saving drivers of demandingness:

precision,
accuracy,
certification;
fine perceptuo-motor — &
creativity/innovation.



Aristotle⁺



Church

Pro Checkers/Chess/Go;
EXPTIME



Turing

Dockworking; NP-Complete

Polynomial Hierarchy

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Analytic Hierarchy

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


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a h



Overlay;
[e.g., Legg-Hutter (now refuted); UCI; MCG⁺]

Analytic Hierarchy

Aristotle⁺

Arithmetic Hierarchy



Church

Exponential Hierarchy

Pro Checkers/Chess/Go;
EXPTIME



Turing

Polynomial Hierarchy

Dockworking; NP-Complete

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Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy



Aristotle⁺



Church


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


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\mathcal{L}_2

Analytic Hierarchy

Arithmetic Hierarchy

Exponential Hierarchy

Polynomial Hierarchy

Aristotle⁺



Church

Pro Checkers/Chess/Go;
EXPTIME




Turing

Dockworking; NP-Complete



Logically speaking, what's innate in you?



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



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
Logically speaking, what's innate in you?

This is innate and distinctive: $1 \mathcal{L}_3 + 1 \mu\mathcal{L}_3 + \text{art d'infaillibilité}$




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


The diagram shows a deep neural network with an input layer on the left, three hidden layers in the middle, and an output layer on the right. Each layer consists of a vertical column of nodes, and every node in one layer is connected to every node in the next layer. Labels in red text identify the layers: 'input layer' on the left, 'hidden layer 1', 'hidden layer 2', and 'hidden layer 3' above the middle columns, and 'output layer' on the right. The text 'This is innate and distinctive: $1 \mathcal{L}_3 + 1 \mu \mathcal{L}_3 + \text{art d'infaillibilité}$ ' is overlaid on the diagram.






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


Logically speaking, what's innate in you, & what should be "innate" in a cognitive robot?


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PERI.2 has innate socio-multi-modal \mathcal{L}_3 capacity.




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PERI.2 has innate socio-multi-modal \mathcal{L}_3 capacity.

This command cannot be understood and obeyed without a capacity for third-order logic and planning.

$\gamma :=$ "Pick up a sphere with a color property that matches one object a has, & prove that what you did was correct."





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$$\gamma := \exists X \exists x [Color(X) \wedge Up(x) \wedge X(a) \wedge X(x)]$$




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


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Propositional Calculus III:

Reductio ad Absurdum

(negation intro & negation elimination in HS[®])

Selmer Bringsjord

Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
Department of Cognitive Science
Department of Computer Science
Lally School of Management & Technology
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy, New York 12180 USA

Intro to Formal Logic (& AI)
1/30/2025



Let's win some trophies in HG:HS

...

Reductio ...

“Reductio ad absurdum, which Euclid loved so much, is one of a mathematician’s finest weapons. It is a far finer gambit than any chess gambit: a chess player may offer the sacrifice of a pawn or even a piece, but a mathematician offers the game.”

–G. H. Hardy

A Greek-shocking Example ...

$$\frac{p}{q}$$

What are rational numbers?

$$\frac{p}{q}$$

What are rational numbers?

- Any number that can be expressed in the form of $\frac{p}{q}$ such that we have a numerator p and a non-zero denominator.
- Rational numbers are a subset of real numbers!
- Examples of *irrational* numbers?

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- Examples of *irrational* numbers?

$$\sqrt{2}$$

Prove that:

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$$\sqrt{2}$$

Prove that:

$\sqrt{2}$ is irrational

Suppose $\sqrt{2}$ is **rational**. That means it can be written as the ratio of two integers p and q

$$\sqrt{2} = \frac{p}{q} \quad (1)$$

where we may assume that p and q **have no common factors**. (If there are any common factors we cancel them in the numerator and denominator.) Squaring in (1) on both sides gives

$$2 = \frac{p^2}{q^2} \quad (2)$$

which implies

$$p^2 = 2q^2 \quad (3)$$

Thus p^2 is even. The only way this can be true is that p itself is even. But then p^2 is actually divisible by 4. Hence q^2 and therefore q must be even. So p and q are both even which is a contradiction to our assumption that they have no common factors. The square root of 2 cannot be rational!

Sizing Some Sets (see LAMA-BDLA)

\mathbb{Q}^+

?

\mathbb{Z}^+

\mathbb{N}

\mathbb{R}^+

Sizing Some Sets (see LAMA-BDLA)



\mathbb{Z}^+

\mathbb{Q}^+
 \mathbb{N}

\mathbb{R}^+


Sizing Some Sets (see LAMA-BDLA)



\mathbb{N}
 $\mathbb{Q}^+ \quad \mathbb{Z}^+$


\mathbb{R}^+

Sizing Some Sets (see LAMA-BDLA)




\mathbb{R}^+


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Sizing Some Sets (see LAMA-BDLA)



And now, what are *prime* numbers?

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- A number that can be divided by only two numbers, one and itself.
- Must be a whole number.
- Example: 2,3,5,7.....

And recall: Euclidean “Magic”

Theorem: There are infinitely many primes.

Proof: We take an indirect route. Let $\Pi = p_1 = 2, p_2 = 3, p_3 = 5, \dots, p_k$ be a finite, exhaustive consecutive sequence of prime numbers. Next, let M_Π be $p_1 \times p_2 \times \dots \times p_k$, and set M'_Π to $M_\Pi + 1$. Either M'_Π is prime, or not; we thus have two (exhaustive) cases to consider.

- C1 Suppose M'_Π is prime. In this case we immediately have a prime number beyond any in Π — contradiction!
- C2 Suppose on the other hand that M'_Π is *not* prime. Then some prime p divides M'_Π . (Why?) Now, p itself is either in Π , or not; we hence have two sub-cases. Supposing that p is in Π entails that p divides M_Π . But we are operating under the supposition that p divides M'_Π as well. This implies that p divides 1, which is absurd (a contradiction). Hence the prime p is outside Π .

Hence for *any* such list Π , there is a prime outside the list. That is, there are infinitely many primes. **QED**

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(What is proof by cases in HyperSlate®?)

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(What is proof by cases in HyperSlate®?)

Study it word by word until you endorse it with your very soul — and consider variants on this theorem as conjectures that you yourself can attempt to settle!

Hence for *any* such list Π , there is a prime outside the list. That is, there are infinitely many primes. QED

Are we supposed to understand
indirect proof = proof by
contradiction = *reductio ad
absurdum* = *reductio* in high school?

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indirect proof = proof by
contradiction = *reductio ad
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Affirmative.

From Algebra 2 in High School ...

(Pearson Common-Core Compliant Textbook)

A proof involving indirect reasoning is an **indirect proof**. Often in an indirect proof, a statement and its negation are the only possibilities. When you see that one of these possibilities leads to a conclusion that contradicts a fact you know to be true, you can eliminate that possibility. For this reason, indirect proof is sometimes called *proof by contradiction*.

TAKE NOTE Key Concept

Writing an Indirect Proof

- Step 1** State as a temporary assumption the opposite (negation) of what you want to prove.
- Step 2** Show that this temporary assumption leads to a contradiction.
- Step 3** Conclude that the temporary assumption must be false and that what you want to prove must be true.

Problem 3 Writing an Indirect Proof

Proof

Given: $\triangle ABC$ is scalene.

Prove: $\angle A$, $\angle B$, and $\angle C$ all have different measures.

THINK

Assume temporarily the opposite of what you want to prove.

Show that this assumption leads to a contradiction.

Conclude that the temporary assumption must be false and that what you want to prove must be true.

WRITE

Assume temporarily that two angles of $\triangle ABC$ have the same measure. Assume that $m\angle A = m\angle B$.

By the Converse of the Isosceles Triangle Theorem, the sides opposite $\angle A$ and $\angle B$ are congruent. This contradicts the given information that $\triangle ABC$ is scalene.

The assumption that two angles of $\triangle ABC$ have the same measure must be false. Therefore, $\angle A$, $\angle B$, and $\angle C$ all have different measures.

 SHOW SOLUTION

 GOT IT?

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@article{moore.proof,  
  Author = {R. C. Moore},  
  Journal = {Educational Studies in Mathematics},  
  Pages = {249-266},  
  Title = {Making the Transition to Formal Proof},  
  Volume = {27.3},  
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```

▶ SHOW SOLUTION

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(A very
important
paper.)

▶ SHOW SOLUTION

▶ GOT IT?

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

Can you create a formal proof in HyperSlate®?




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(A very important paper.)

SHOW SOLUTION

GOT IT?






Formal definition;
you may prefer to
avoid, but :) ...

Ask questions if
need be! Thx!

Explosion



Explosion: Partial Proof Plan

Slate - explosion.slt

GIVEN. $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$
{GIVEN} Assume ✓


3. $\neg\psi$
{3} Assume ✓

4. φ
 \wedge elim ✗


5. $\neg\varphi$
 \wedge elim ✗

\neg elim ✗

GOAL. ψ



GreenCheeseMoon I



GreenCheeseMoon I: Partial Proof Plan

Slate - GreenCheeseMoon1.slt

GIVEN. $\neg(P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow P))$
{GIVEN} Assume ✓

Sub-Proof Here

5. P
{5} Assume ✓

3. $P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow P)$
PC = ✓

4. $\neg G$
{4} Assume ✓

GOAL. G
 \neg elim ✗

Interlude:

HyperSlate® & High School Geometry:
A Glimpse Ahead ...



Geometry Reduced to Formal Logic

SECTION 3.3

Proving Congruent Triangles



"... mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true."

– Bertrand Russell; *Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics*, published in *International Monthly*, vol. 4

Do you have one of those friends who always doubts everything that you say? One of those people who always says, "Nuh-uh! No way!" (The person may even believe you, but your statement is so amazingly shocking that they can't believe that it could be true.) They can't believe your statement until they've seen it from a credible source or heard it from enough people.



Well, thank that person. Knowing things with certainty is a rare, rare occurrence.



Geometry Reduced to Formal Logic

SEC



It's getting harder and harder to determine what is true. People can manipulate pictures or sounds so well that it's near impossible to believe anything.

So if we can't be 100% certain by using physical objects, the only way to prove a fact with certainty is with pure logic. A proof is the logical structure of making an argument with clearly stated facts, and making logical conclusions with supporting reasons. If other people can understand your proof and agree that it is logically correct, then they can agree that the fact that you are stating must be true. This is the purpose of proof within mathematics: *making a clear logical argument so that others can understand and agree with your claim.*


A proof is different from a definition. A definition is closer to just naming something. We can define a dog: a highly variable carnivorous domesticated mammal of the genus *Canis* (*C. familiaris*) closely related to the common wolf (*Canis lupus*). This is not *proving* what a dog is.

In geometry, we can define objects as well.

Definition: Vertical Angles are a pair of opposite angles formed by two intersecting lines.

$\angle 1$ and $\angle 3$ are vertical angles.

$\angle 2$ and $\angle 4$ are also vertical angles.



Suppose I make the statement, "If two angles are vertical angles, then they are congruent." This is making a claim about vertical angles. Someone may or may not agree with this claim. I would have to provide a proof to convince them that this statement is true.

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Geometry Reduced to Formal Logic

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We need to talk ...

Uh-oh



about \cong Δ 's!

Phew!




All right! Let's prove some triangles congruent!!

Example:

Given: $\overline{HO} \cong \overline{OM}$

\overline{OE} bisects $\angle HOM$

Prove: $\triangle HOE \cong \triangle MOE$ and name the transformation



PROOF: We know $\overline{HO} \cong \overline{OM}$, so we have one pair of sides congruent in each triangle. Because \overline{OE} bisects $\angle HOM$, $\angle HOE \cong \angle MOE$ because if an angle is bisected, it is divided into 2 \cong angles. This is a pair of angles congruent in each triangle. Finally, $\overline{OE} \cong \overline{OE}$ by the reflexive property giving another side in each triangle. By the SAS \cong theorem, $\triangle HOE \cong \triangle MOE$.

The transformation needed is a reflection over \overline{OE} .

I methodically showed that each triangle had the three parts necessary to use the SAS \cong theorem. Completing a proof with this paragraph format is like writing a conversation. I'm just thinking about how I would explain it to a friend, and each statement that I am making about the parts in each triangle needs some sort of explanation to back up why they are congruent.



Geometry Reduced to Formal Logic


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Another form of a proof is a two-column proof. It gives a little more structure than a conversation.

Example:

Given: $\angle T \cong \angle N$, G is the midpt. of \overline{NT}

Prove: $\triangle SGN \cong \triangle IGT$ and name the transformation



PROOF:

	Statements	Reasons
(A)	1) $\angle T \cong \angle N$	1) Given
	2) G is the midpt. of \overline{NT}	2) Given
(S)	3) $\overline{GN} \cong \overline{GT}$	3)
(A)	4) $\angle SGN \cong \angle IGT$	4) If two angles are vertical angles, then they are congruent. (Vert \angle s \rightarrow \cong)
	5) $\triangle SGN \cong \triangle IGT$	5)

Guess what you could write as a reason for these steps. Think "If A, then B." Tap to check.

Note to self: I'm going to put an "A" or "S" whenever I get a part in each triangle congruent. It'll help me know when I've got my three pieces, and help determine what method I'm using.

The transformation needed is a rotation of 180° about pt. G

In this format, a proof is made up of *statements* and *reasons*. Each step is clearly thought out and explained why it is true.

The statements talk specifically about this problem.

The reasons talk generally using conditional sentences, "If I know A, then B logically follows."

In order to prove congruent triangles, somewhere in my statements I needed to say three parts of this triangle are congruent to these three parts of the other triangle. Then I could determine which method to use for congruent triangles.

Remember:

To use a conditional statement, you must establish the hypothesis A is true first (i.e. in a previous step).

Further Reading: Tarski's System(s) of Geometry

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TARSKI'S SYSTEM OF GEOMETRY

ALFRED TARSKI AND STEVEN GIVANT

Abstract. This paper is an edited form of a letter written by the two authors (in the name of Tarski) to Wolfram Schwabhäuser around 1978. It contains extended remarks about Tarski's system of foundations for Euclidean geometry, in particular its distinctive features, its historical evolution, the history of specific axioms, the questions of independence of axioms and primitive notions, and versions of the system suitable for the development of 1-dimensional geometry.

In his 1926–27 lectures at the University of Warsaw, Alfred Tarski gave an axiomatic development of elementary Euclidean geometry, the part of plane Euclidean geometry that is not based upon set-theoretical notions, or, in other words, the part that can be developed within the framework of first-order logic. He proved, around 1930, that his system of geometry admits elimination of quantifiers: every formula is provably equivalent (on the basis of the axioms) to a Boolean combination of basic formulas. From this theorem he drew several fundamental corollaries. First, the theory is complete: every assertion is either provable or refutable. Second, the theory is decidable—there is a mechanical procedure for determining whether or not any given assertion is provable. Third, there is a constructive consistency proof for the theory. Substantial simplifications in Tarski's axiom system and the development of geometry based on them were obtained by Tarski and his students during the period 1955–65. All of these various results were described in Tarski [41], [44], [45], and Gupta [5].

Aside from the importance of its metamathematical properties, Tarski's system of geometry merits attention because of the extreme elegance and simplicity of its set of axioms, especially in the final form that it achieved around 1965. Yet, until fairly recently, no systematic development of geometry based on his axioms existed. In the early 1960s Wanda Szmielew and Tarski began the project of preparing a treatise on the foundations of geometry developed within the framework of contemporary mathematical logic. A systematic development of Euclidean geometry based on Tarski's axioms was to constitute the first part of the treatise. The project made

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of the axiom schema As. 11. Thus it is an axiom set for elementary 2-dimensional Euclidean geometry. The possibility of modifying the dimension axioms Ax. 8⁽²⁾ and Ax. 9₁⁽²⁾ in order to obtain an axiom set for n -dimensional geometry is briefly mentioned. (The case $n = 1$ will be disregarded in this section and in Sections 3–5.) The passage to an axiom set for the full (non-elementary) Euclidean geometry, by replacing all instances of the axiom schema As. 11 with Ax. 11, is not mentioned explicitly.

The next version of the axiom set appeared in Tarski [41]. Since $=$ is treated there as a logical notion, Ax. 13 and Ax. 19 are easily derivable from the remaining axioms, and therefore have been omitted. Ax. 20 is replaced by a somewhat more concise variant, Ax. 20₁; we do not analyze this modification since Ax. 20 is dropped entirely in subsequent versions.

A rather substantial simplification of the axiom set in Tarski [41] was obtained in 1956–57 as a result of joint efforts by Eva Kallin, Scott Taylor, and Tarski (see Tarski [44], p. 20, footnote). First, four axioms, Ax. 5₁, Ax. 7₂, Ax. 9₁⁽²⁾, and Ax. 10, have been respectively replaced by equivalent formulations Ax. 5, Ax. 7₁, Ax. 9⁽²⁾, and Ax. 10₁. In the case of Ax. 9₁⁽²⁾ the new formulation differs essentially from the old one, in both its form and its mathematical content. In the remaining three cases the differences are very slight. Some remarks in the later discussion will throw light on the purpose of all these modifications. Next, in the modified axiom set six axioms, Ax. 12, Ax. 14, Ax. 16, Ax. 17, Ax. 20₁, and Ax. 21, are shown to be derivable from the remaining ones, and hence are omitted. Thus we arrive at the set consisting of twelve axioms: Ax. 1–Ax. 6, Ax. 7₁, Ax. 8⁽²⁾, Ax. 9⁽²⁾, Ax. 10₁, Ax. 15, Ax. 18, and all instances of the old axiom schema As. 11. This axiom set was discussed by Tarski in his course on the foundations of geometry given at the University of California, Berkeley, during the academic year 1956–57. It appeared in print in Tarski [44]. It was pointed out there that, by enriching the logical framework of our system of geometry and by replacing the axiom schema As. 11 with the (second-order) sentence Ax. 11, we arrive at an axiom set for the full (non-elementary) 2-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Also, it was mentioned that, by replacing Ax. 8⁽²⁾ and Ax. 9⁽²⁾ in either of the two above axiom sets with their n -dimensional analogues ($n = 3, 4, \dots$), which are explicitly listed in Section 1 above as Ax. 8^(n) and Ax. 9^(n), axiom sets for n -dimensional geometry are obtained.

Some general metamathematical results, published at about the same time in Scott [30] and Szmielew [37], show that the dimension axioms Ax. 8^(n) and Ax. 9^(n), and Euclid's axiom Ax. 10₁ can be equivalently replaced by a great variety of sentences. The results will be discussed in Section 4, in connection with the axioms involved. It does not seem that these results lead to any formal simplification of the axiom sets discussed here.

of the axiom schema As. 11. Thus it is an axiom set for elementary 2-dimensional Euclidean geometry. The possibility of modifying the dimension axioms Ax. $8^{(2)}$ and Ax. $9_1^{(2)}$ in order to obtain an axiom set for n -dimensional geometry is briefly mentioned. (The case $n = 1$ will be disregarded in this section and in Sections 3–5.) The passage to an axiom set for the full (non-elementary) Euclidean geometry, by replacing all instances of the axiom schema As. 11 with Ax. 11, is not mentioned explicitly.

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