

Gödel's God Theorem, (Selmer's Mental Family?)

Selmer Bringsjord

Intro to Formal Logic (With AI)

April 20 2026

RPI

Troy NY USA

version 042026



Logic, The Science of Formalization, Needed!



Illustration by Max Guther

**We Don't Really Know
How A.I. Works.
That's a Problem.**

For us to trust it on certain subjects, researchers in the growing field of interpretability might need to learn how to open the black box of its brain.

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Okay, what does this course say should be done to fix the problem?

$$\mathcal{L}^\star = \langle L = \langle A, G \rangle, I \rangle + \mathbf{AxAI}$$

But first, HyperGrader
releases & help ...

?

RipsSaysNo imbroglio.
Cheaters Never Prosper — again.
A Mighty Arturo setup.

⋮

Required: April 27 now ...

Fun Times @ Penn

“Proving that God exists
is no harder than proving
that $2+2=4$ from **PA**.”



Context ...

Could Artificial Intelligence Ever ... Match Personal Intelligence?

Gödelian Essays on Persons vs. Pretenders

by Selmer Bringsjord et al.

- Introduction (“The Wager”)
- Brief Preliminaries (e.g. the propositional calculus & FOL)
- The Completeness Theorem
- The First Incompleteness Theorem
- The Second Incompleteness Theorem
- The Speedup Theorem
- The Continuum-Hypothesis Theorem
- The Time-Travel Theorem
- Gödel’s “God Theorem”
- Could a Finite Machine Match Gödel’s Greatness?



STOP & REVIEW IF NEEDED!

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
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The Ontological/Modal Argument Meets AI

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The Ontological/Modal Argument Meets AI

"The Other Way"

Scott's version
of Gödel
verified!

Gödel's version
of Gödel
falsified!



Anselm

Descartes

Leibniz

Gödel/Adams



Some Key Arguments/Results Up to Present

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 - <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.08955.pdf>

Theorems ...

Benzmüller-Scott-Gödel

A1 Either a property or its negation is positive, but not both:

$$\forall \phi [P(\neg \phi) \equiv \neg P(\phi)]$$

A2 A property necessarily implied by a positive property is positive:

$$\forall \phi \forall \psi [(P(\phi) \wedge \Box \forall x [\phi(x) \supset \psi(x)]) \supset P(\psi)]$$

T1 Positive properties are possibly exemplified:

$$\forall \phi [P(\phi) \supset \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)]$$

D1 A *God-like* being possesses all positive properties:

$$G(x) \equiv \forall \phi [P(\phi) \supset \phi(x)]$$

A3 The property of being God-like is positive:

$$P(G)$$

C Possibly, God exists:

$$\Diamond \exists x G(x)$$

A4 Positive properties are necessarily positive:

$$\forall \phi [P(\phi) \supset \Box P(\phi)]$$

D2 An *essence* of an individual is a property possessed by it and necessarily implying any of its properties:

$$\phi \text{ ess. } x \equiv \phi(x) \wedge \forall \psi (\psi(x) \supset \Box \forall y (\phi(y) \supset \psi(y)))$$

T2 Being God-like is an essence of any God-like being:

$$\forall x [G(x) \supset G \text{ ess. } x]$$

D3 *Necessary existence* of an individ. is the necessary exemplification of all its essences:

$$NE(x) \equiv \forall \phi [\phi \text{ ess. } x \supset \Box \exists y \phi(y)]$$

A5 Necessary existence is a positive property:

$$P(NE)$$

T3 Necessarily, God exists:

$$\Box \exists x G(x)$$

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- T2 Being God-like is an essence of any God-like being:

$$\forall x [G(x) \supset G \text{ ess. } x]$$
- D3 *Necessary existence* of an individ. is the necessary exemplification of all its essences: $NE(x) \equiv \forall \phi [\phi \text{ ess. } x \supset \Box \exists y \phi(y)]$
- A5 Necessary existence is a positive property: $P(NE)$
- T3 Necessarily, God exists: $\Box \exists x G(x)$



Benzmüller-Scott-Gödel

X

A Victorious Gödelian Variant?

Intelligently extracted from Gödel/Benzmüller's A1; F1a from Oppy.

$$\forall R(Pos(R) \rightarrow \neg Pos(\bar{R}))$$

Gödel/Benzmüller's A2; F2 from Oppy.

$$\forall R, R'[Pos(R) \wedge \Box \forall x(R(x) \rightarrow R'(x))] \rightarrow Pos(R')]$$

N2 (Necessary existence is positive):

$$Pos(NE)$$

Def of strongly positive:

$$\forall R[Pos!(R) \leftrightarrow Pos(ER)]$$

Theorem 5 — welcome-weak? — from Oppy:

$$\forall R[Pos!(R) \rightarrow \Box \exists xER(x)]$$

Variant: *Positive to Great-making*

Intelligently extracted from Gödel/Benzmüller's A1; F1a from Oppy.

$$\forall R(GM(R) \rightarrow \neg GM(\bar{R}))$$

Gödel/Benzmüller's A2; F2 from Oppy.

$$\forall R, R'[GM(R) \wedge \Box \forall x(R(x) \rightarrow R'(x))] \rightarrow GM(R')]$$

$$GM(NE)$$

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$$GM(NE)$$


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
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


The Ontological/Modal Argument Meets AI

"The Other Way"



Are Formal Inductive Arguments Even Better?



"The Other Way"

museo interreligioso
BERTINORO

25°
CENTRO RESIDENZIALE
UNIVERSITARIO 1994 - 2019

things

metanlanguage

THE REALM OF THINGS

cognizers

things that aren't but ~~can't~~ exist

$\neg \exists! \wedge \exists!$

- Harry Potter
- A 10' tall NBA star.
- A thoroughly honest & Einstein-level-smart politician.

C1

cognizers

things that are ~~not~~ but ~~can't~~ exist

can fail to $\exists! \wedge \exists!$

- You/me
- Mr. Bean
- Bringsjord

C2

logico-mathematically possible that ϕ

$\Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$

$\Box \phi$ — necessary —

things that don't exist & ~~can't~~

$\neg \exists! \wedge \neg \exists!$

- a paper both 5 pages & 10 pages long
- a square circle
- a largest $n \in \mathbb{N}$

C3

things that ~~exist~~ and must ~~exist~~

$\exists! \wedge \Box \exists!$

modus tollens

- being ~~Euclidean~~ ~~irrational~~
- the number four
- $\pi \in \mathbb{R}$

C4

names constants
def. descriptions
object variables

properties $R_1 R_2 R_3 \dots$

can be R or $\neg R$

ethics
love
power
acts
emotions
overlaid

Wouldn't this approach help much more with Ross's proof?? He has uncancelable, unpreventable, creator of all contingent things, etc

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**New Family of Mental Arguments;
Email if Interested**

New Family of Mental Arguments; Email if Interested

A New Family of Mental Arguments*

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version 1204231154NY

New Family of Mental Arguments; Email if Interested

A New Family of Mental Arguments*

⁴I refer, note, to the *original* series; but I do so without loss of generality, since nothing fundamentally changes in subsequent spinoffs.

⁵For a full definition of personhood, see (Bringsjord 1997, Bringsjord, Noel & Caporale 2000) (or any other credible account; e.g., see Dennett 1978, Chisholm 1978). Here, without the surrounding discussion from that book, is the definition, amended slightly for the present paper: x is a person if and only if x has the *capacity*

1. to “will,” to make choices and decisions, set plans and projects — autonomously;
2. for consciousness,⁶ for experiencing pain and sorrow and happiness, and a thousand other emotions — love, passion, gratitude, and so on;
3. for *self*-consciousness, for being aware of his/her states of mind, inclinations, preferences, etc., and for grasping the concept of him/herself;
4. to communicate through a language;
 - Note: The language here should at minimum be at the level of one determined by a mildly Type-0 grammar. For now (I return below to the issue), I leave this formal constraint aside, and mention only that one of the extraordinary things about human persons is that the natural languages over which they have command are at least at this level, when viewed through the lens of formal logic. From the point of view of the present paper, the greatness of us, on the linguistic side, can be viewed as at least partially revealed in the rather famous (Chomsky 1956). However, many philosophers and logicians will know that so-called “Type 0” grammars in Chomsky’s hierarchy were being specified, probed, and understood by Post (himself, of course, a human person) in the 1920’s. Post didn’t publish these grammars till much later, in (Post 1943).
5. to know and believe propositions of great complexity,
 - Note: I leave at this sport the concept of complexity informal. It would be easy enough to pin things down via both extensional (e.g. quantificational complexity regimented by the standard $\Delta_i, \Sigma_j, \Pi_k$ categorization) and intensional (e.g. layers of epistemic and other modal operators) complexity measures for formulae that capture propositions. I return to this below.

and to believe things about what others believe (second-order beliefs), and to believe things about what others believe about one’s beliefs (third-order beliefs), and so on;
6. to desire not only particular objects and events, but also changes in his or her character, and in the character of others;
7. to reason (for example, in the fashion exhibited in the writing and reading/studying of this very paper).

New Family of Mental Arguments; Email if Interested

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5. to know and believe propositions

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) (2') (2a) $\therefore$ (3) | <p>The greatest things are persons, and the non-divine variety are here.</p> <p>If the greatest things are persons, and the non-divine variety are here, then either God exists and is the ground of this state-of-affairs or E_2 is or E_3 is or ... or E_n is.</p> <p>It is not the case that E_2 is, and it is not the case that E_3 is and ... and it is not the case that E_n is.</p> <p>God exists.</p> |
|--|---|

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